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Abstract
Background: Nepal's Safe Delivery Incentive Programme (SDIP) was introduced nationwide in
2005 with the intention of increasing utilisation of professional care at childbirth. It provided cash
to women giving birth in a health facility and an incentive to the health provider for each delivery
attended, either at home or in the facility. We explored early implementation of the programme
at the district-level to understand the factors that have contributed to its low uptake.
Methods: We conducted in ten study districts a series of key informant interviews and focus
group discussions with staff from health facilities and the district health office and other
stakeholders involved in implementation. Manual content analysis was used to categorise data
under emerging themes.
Results: Problems at the central level imposed severe constraints on the ability of district-level
actors to implement the programme. These included bureaucratic delays in the disbursement of
funds, difficulties in communicating the policy, both to implementers and the wider public and the
complexity of the programme's design. However, some district implementers were able to cope
with these problems, providing reasons for why uptake of the programme varied considerably
between districts. Actions appeared to be influenced by the pressure to meet local needs, as well
individual perceptions and acceptance of the programme. The experience also sheds light on some
of the adverse effects of the programme on the wider health system.
Conclusion: The success of conditional cash transfer programmes in Latin America has led to a
wave of enthusiasm for their adoption in other parts of the world. However, context matters and
proponents of similar programmes in south Asia should give due attention to the challenges to
implementation when capacity is weak and health services inadequate.
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Programmes that provide monetary incentives condi-
tional on households engaging in certain health seeking
behaviours have been popular for the past decade, partic-
ularly in Latin America. Such programmes have been
implemented at scale, and typically target poor families
and children [1,2]. Conditional cash transfers can be an
effective means to increase utilisation of preventive health
services and, in some cases, improve health outcomes
[3,4]. However, the literature also points to problems,
including: the inefficiencies of paying some people to do
what they would have done anyway [5]; the high admin-
istrative cost of programmes [6]; the potential for unin-
tended effects [7]; and ethical concerns, such as those
related to the promotion of permanent contraceptive
methods [4].
Interest in using cash incentives to influence behaviour
and promote the health of families has spread to south
Asia. Progress in raising the low coverage of skilled birth
attendance (ie. delivery attended by either a doctor, nurse
or midwife) in the region has been slow [8] and it is
against this backdrop of relative stagnation that Nepal,
India and Bangladesh have adopted policies to provide
financial incentives to women in an effort to encourage
greater use of maternity services [9-11]. While these poli-
cies are not intended to act as a social safety net – they are
more orientated towards behavioural change – they still
share many of the same characteristics as conditional cash
transfer programmes.
This paper reports the findings of a qualitative study
describing implementation of Nepal's scheme to under-
stand the factors that have hindered uptake of the pro-
gramme. Nepal's Safe Delivery Incentives Programme
(SDIP) (formerly known as the Maternity Incentives
Scheme) was launched in 2005, with the aim of raising
the coverage of skilled birth attendance. It marked a
departure from past government policy that had tended to
focus predominantly on service delivery without serious
regard for demand side barriers. The establishment of the
SDIP was a response to mounting evidence of the high
cost faced by households trying to access care at childbirth
[12] and the low coverage of skilled birth attendance,
most recently estimated at 19 percent [13].
National implementation of the programme meant that
there were few opportunities to pilot different implemen-
tation approaches and develop mechanisms to verify the
eligibility of women, pay beneficiaries, and monitor the
programme, elements deemed essential for implementa-
tion [1]. In countries like Nepal, with weak governance
and limited capacity [14], the need for such systems is per-
haps all the more vital. Concerns were also raised about
the complexity of the programme and how this might
affect implementation.
We aim to shed light on these issues and, more broadly,
contribute to the small body of literature on health policy
implementation in developing countries [15,16]. Our
approach is broadly descriptive, seeking to identify what
is happening in terms of the design, implementation,
administration, and operation of the programme;
whether it is expected; and the reasons behind why it is
happening as it is [16,17]. We focused on the experiences
of actors involved in the programme at the district level in
order to give a bottom-up perspective of the implementa-
tion process. A description of the design of the pro-
gramme and its implementation at the central level
establishes the context in which district level actors were
operating. An important part of the story, namely the for-
mulation of the policy, has been described elsewhere [18].
Safe Delivery Incentives Programme
The SDIP sought to change the behaviour of both families
and health workers though a package of financial incen-
tives (table 1) that included: i) a conditional cash transfer
to women; ii) an incentive to the health provider for each
delivery attended; and iii) free health care, in addition to
the conditional cash transfer, for those women from the
25 least developed districts [11]. There have been a
number of changes made to the design of the SDIP since
our study. Here, we describe the benefits and eligibility
criteria that were in place during the study period – ie. the
first 18 months of the programme.
Table 1: Financial incentives offered by the SDIP and the eligibility criteria
Financial incentive Eligibility criteria
1. Conditional cash transfer to women
▪ 500 NRS ($7.8) in plains districts
▪ 1,000 NRS ($15.6) in hill districts
▪ 1,500 NRS ($23.4) in mountain districts
Woman delivered in a public health facility and had no more than two living children or an 
obstetric complication (as diagnosed by the health provider)
2. Provider incentive
▪ 300 NRS ($4.7) for each delivery attended
Doctor, nurse, midwife, health assistant, auxiliary health worker or maternal and child 
health worker attended a delivery at the woman's home or in a public health facility
3. Free delivery care to women and facility reimbursed
▪ 1,000 NRS ($15.6) reimbursed to health facility
Woman comes from one of the 25 least developed districts and meets the eligibility 
criteria required for the conditional cash transferPage 2 of 11
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health facility. Money was to be paid by the health pro-
vider or accountant on discharge and the amount was set
to reflect differences in accessibility to health facilities
across the three main geographical regions of Nepal (table
1). In contrast to many performance-based payment
schemes, the government chose to provide a universal
conditional cash transfer rather than one targeted towards
the poorest. This decision was driven by the desire to gain
political popularity, as well as concerns about equity [18].
The SDIP intended to alleviate some of the transport costs
of accessing care. The conditional cash transfer repre-
sented 30–50 percent of the mean transport cost incurred
by a family seeking delivery care at a health facility [12].
Two groups of women were eligible to receive the money:
i) women with up to two living children; and ii) women
with any number of specified obstetric complications,
irrespective of parity. The rationale for the first of these eli-
gibility criteria was to avoid a risk of the SDIP increasing
fertility. Clearly, the use of cash rather than a voucher sys-
tem meant that money had to be transferred from the dis-
trict health office to the health facility and, once there,
securely kept. In many health centres with no accountant
or bank account, this implied the handling of large sums
of cash by health workers.
The SDIP also provided 300 NRS ($4.7) to health workers
for each delivery attended. Surprisingly, perhaps, the pro-
vider incentive was given for deliveries attended both at
the health facility and at home. Policymakers were anx-
ious that the SDIP should not neglect home deliveries
altogether, as it was unrealistic to expect the majority of
women, even over the medium term, to deliver in health
facilities given the current low coverage rate. However,
this decision gave rise to a possible tension with the con-
ditional cash transfer, on the one hand, incentivising
institutional deliveries and the provider incentive, on the
other hand, encouraging health workers to attend home
deliveries. The policy specified the cadres of health worker
eligible to receive the incentive, but was intentionally
vague on whether or how the incentive should be shared
amongst health workers, leaving the decision to the health
facility management committee. Initially, auxiliary health
workers were not eligible for the provider incentive, but
after one year of widespread protests, the policy was
changed to include them.
Free maternity care was available to women from the 25
least developed districts as an additional benefit to the
conditional cash transfer. The policy stipulated that health
facilities were to be given 1,000 NRS ($15.7) for each
delivery provided free of charge, as a reimbursement to
recover costs.
Central level implementation
The central government issued guidelines to each district
health office, zonal hospital and regional hospital on the
how the SDIP should be designed and implemented [11].
In some respects (eg. sharing of the provider incentive),
the guidelines gave actors at the district level discretion
over implementation. On other matters (eg. the eligibility
criteria), they represented a set of regulations that were
intended to be strictly applied. In the absence of training,
the guidelines were the primary means by which the pol-
icy was communicated to implementers at the district
level.
There were lengthy delays in the transfer of funds from the
central level (including the donor) to the districts. On
average, districts received funds earmarked for the SDIP
283 days late in the first fiscal year, and 147 days late in
the second fiscal year [19]. To initiate implementation of
the SDIP as quickly as possible, the central level govern-
ment encouraged districts to start paying beneficiaries
using funds from other budget lines or borrow money
from local partners. Wary of raising expectations amongst
the public before ensuring funds were available to pay
beneficiaries, the central level programme managers
chose not to publicise the SDIP with a national media
campaign. To be precise, the SDIP's launch was publicly
announced; however, there was no national information
campaign explaining the benefits of the programme and
who could benefit
Uptake of the programme
Available data suggest uptake of the programme in its first
two years was, broadly speaking, low. The most reliable
data, from a household survey carried out in six districts,
indicate that 29 percent of eligible women received the
conditional cash transfer at the time of childbirth and
only 27 percent of women had any knowledge of the pro-
gramme while they were pregnant [19]. There were found
to be wide variations between districts, suggesting imple-
mentation has been more successful in some places than
others. The proportion of eligible women receiving the
cash ranged from 16 percent to 52 percent, while aware-
ness during pregnancy varied from 22 percent to 40 per-
cent. Over the same period, annual expenditure of the
programme was $1.2 million with approximately 50 per-
cent going to women recipients of the conditional cash
transfer [20].
Methods
Study setting
Nepal is a geographically and ethnically diverse country
that has suffered from political conflict and internal
upheaval as the country moved from democracy to mon-
archy and now to an interim phase of political uncertainty
[21]. Himalayan mountains border Tibet to the north,Page 3 of 11
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national income per capita is $340 [22] and while female
literacy is improving, 45 percent of women remain illiter-
ate [13]. Nepal has a maternal mortality rate of 281 per
100,000 live births and a neonatal mortality rate of 33 per
1,000 live births, and only 19 percent of women deliver
with a skilled birth attendant [13].
Study participants and data collection
The study was conducted in 10 districts of Nepal. We pur-
posively sampled two mountain districts, four hill dis-
tricts, and four plains districts to ensure that the variation
in the SDIP's package of benefits across the three topo-
graphical regions was represented. In each district, we
sampled five health institutions that were providing deliv-
ery care (one hospital, two primary health centres and two
health posts). Health facilities were purposively selected
to include two that were near to the district health office
and two that were further away. In addition, two regional
hospitals were sampled from other districts since our
study districts contained no hospitals providing this level
of care.
We aimed to conduct one key informant interview with
the most senior level of health personnel available in each
health facility, a key informant interview with the district
health office and a focus group discussion in each district.
Participants of each focus group discussion were a mix of
health personnel, accountants, non-governmental organ-
isation workers, and management committee members.
In total, 55 key informant interviews and nine focus group
discussions were completed (table 2). Trained Nepali
researchers conducted discussions and kept log-books.
TPJ and ST worked from the offices of Family Health Divi-
sion in the Ministry of Health and Population, and made
notes of their observations during this time. Verbal data
were tape-recorded and transcribed. The study was
approved by the ethics committee of the London School
of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine and written consent
was obtained from each respondent.
Analysis
Researchers who had collected and transcribed the data
conducted manual content analysis [23] with two interna-
tional researchers (TPJ, JM). Initially, 10 transcripts from
different types of respondents and different topographical
areas were categorised under headings from the topic
guides. Categories were refined based on themes emerging
from the data, and thereafter, transcripts were analysed
according to those themes. We analysed all the focus
group discussion data and a random sample of respond-
ents in every district, ensuring coverage of stakeholders
and methods (table 2). After analysis of 51 transcripts we
felt there was saturation and a further 9 transcripts were
read to check for recurring themes. Data were tabulated to
compare responses across types of respondent and topog-
raphy. Analysis was conducted in Nepali, and quotations
were translated into English for publication. The extent to
which observation data corroborated data from tran-
scripts was discussed during analysis, and an observation
report was written, describing the implementation of the
programme.
Results
Variations in implementation
Information on examples of implementation were
obtained from respondents in interviews and focus group
discussions, allowing us to aggregate specific cases into
categories of practices that could be mapped against the
stated policy (table 3).
There were numerous practices in the implementation of
the conditional cash transfer to the women. There were
variations in the interpretation of the eligibility criteria
and the administration of the cash. The former included
cases where health facilities simply ignored the eligibility
criteria altogether, making the cash available to all women
delivering in a public health facility. More serious devia-
tions from policy were apparent when an entire district,
for example, gave cash to women delivering at home.
Such practices might be expected to have the opposite
effect to the SDIP's intended objective of increasing skilled
birth attendance.
Administration of the cash varied in terms of: the amount
of cash given; to whom the cash was given; and the time
at which the cash was given. The practice of giving cash to
husbands was a particular concern to some respondents
who were worried that the money might be misspent.
Most commonly, women were given no money at all or
given it at a later date after being discharged from the
health facility.
There were many instances of health facilities following
their own rules in the payment of the health provider
incentive. Practices varied according to who was entitled
Table 2: Number of key informant interviews completed and 
analysed (in parentheses) by place
Plains Hill Mountain Total
District health office 3 (2) 3 (2) 1 (1) 7 (5)
Regional hospital 0 (0) 2 (2) 0 (0) 2 (0)
Zonal/district hospital 6 (3) 4 (3) 1 (1) 11 (7)
Primary health centre 8 (6) 7 (6) 3 (2) 18 (14)
Health post 7 (6) 6 (5) 4 (3) 17 (14)
Total 24 (17) 22 (18) 9 (7) 55 (42)
Note: In addition, there were nine focus group discussions completed 
and analysed (four in plains, three in hill and two in mountain districts)Page 4 of 11
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shared, and the place of delivery for which health workers
could claim the incentive. Different practices regarding
the sharing of the incentive between health staff were
expected given that the policy guidelines allowed health
facility management committees discretion on this issue.
Some health facilities, however, took practices a step fur-
ther, including non-health workers, such as the account-
ant, in the share of the incentives. The free delivery care
element of the policy was usually implemented as
intended. Sometimes, respondents reported that the
health facility had not been reimbursed for the deliveries
provided free of charge.
Factors affecting implementation
Delays in disbursement, inadequate funds and their consequences
Respondents at all levels of the health system expressed
concern that women were not getting the incentive imme-
diately after delivery. Often, money was not given to
women in time because of delays in money reaching dis-
tricts, inadequate funds or a combination of these factors.
Delays occurred because of the late arrival of fund release
letters from the central level, and the short-term absence
of key district staff who were in the field or in training. In
a few districts, health workers were also experiencing long
delays before receiving their incentive, but more concern
was expressed about the failure to pay women on time,
particularly because the purpose of the cash was to meet
immediate expenses of travel and subsistence.
"As the incentive is given for transportation expenses
it should be given on time." (District hospital, Hill,
Key informant interview)
"In my opinion, the incentive should be given to the
woman immediately after she delivers...if she does not
get the money in her hand she may not be able to bor-
row and then she will face problems." (District hospi-
tal, Hill, Key informant interview)
"We sometimes feel that this scheme should be
stopped. Either the money should arrive on time oth-
erwise it does not have any meaning." (District hospi-
tal, Hill, Key informant interview)
Table 3: Variations in implementation
Policy Practice
1. Conditional cash transfer to women
Women who deliver in a public health facility –     
hospital, primary health centre or health post –
are entitled to a cash payment if they have no more 
than two living children or an obstetric complication.
The cash is given at the time of discharge.
If referred, the woman is to receive the
cash from the referring institution.
▪ Cash given to women delivering at home
▪ Cash given to women delivering in sub-health posts
▪ Cash given to all women, and not limited to those with no more than two living children 
or an obstetric complication
▪ Reduced amount of cash given to women, because the health institution did not have 
sufficient funds 
and equally divided the money among the eligible women
▪ Cash amount deducted from the patient's bill in the absence of any cash to hand over to 
the woman
▪ Cash given on a first come first served basis or selectively due to insufficient funds
▪ Cash not given at time of discharge but at a later time
▪ Cash given to the relatives of women on proof of identity
▪ Cash given to women with abortion complications (not in the policy)
▪ Cash given to women by the referral hospital, rather than the referring institution
▪ No cash given
2. Health provider incentive
Government health professionals – 
medical doctor, nurse, midwife, 
health assistant, auxiliary health worker 
and maternal and child health worker
– are entitled to an incentive for every
delivery they attend either at home 
or at a government health facility
▪ Incentive to health workers given only for attendance at those deliveries in which the 
woman 
has no more than two living children or an obstetric complication
▪ Incentive divided up among all staff involved in delivery care
▪ Incentive given to a single health professional involved in the delivery
▪ A share of the incentive taken by non health professionals – eg. the accountant
▪ Incentive given to health professionals for attending institutional deliveries only, not home 
deliveries
▪ Incentive claimed by health professionals for attending deliveries in private clinics
▪ No incentive given to health professionals
3. Free delivery care to women
Women eligible for the cash incentive  
and resident in a low human development district
are also entitled to free delivery care. 
The health institution is reimbursed 1,000 NRS 
for each case of free delivery care given
▪ Free delivery provided to all women, and not limited to 
those with no more than two living children or an obstetric complication
▪ Health institution not reimbursed for the free deliveryPage 5 of 11
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had been inadequate to pay beneficiaries. The amount
budgeted did not match requirements, or the amount
released was less than the amount stated in the budget.
There was frustration that the central level did not consult
with the district level in the development of plans, even
when the district had taken the initiative to plan how to
spend the budget.
When money was not available to give to eligible women
at the time of delivery, a number of issues arose. First, it
was difficult to find or contact women in order to give
them the money, particularly those in remote areas or
those whose whereabouts were unknown. Outstanding
debts accumulated and many women, at the time of this
study, were yet to be paid:
"Since we have no money during the time of delivery
we have to ask [women] to come later to collect the
incentive. It will be difficult to find them later on, and
many do not contact us. You see the problem?"
(Health post, Hill, Key informant interview)
"Women come from 60 kilometres away for delivery.
If they do not receive the money immediately after
delivery, how many times can they come from so far,
just for 500 rupees, and how many times can they
call?" (District stakeholders, Plains, Focus group dis-
cussion)
Second, a failure to give the incentive created a perception
that health institutions were withholding money, leading
to friction and mistrust of health personnel:
"We started working with a tentative plan but as the
number of deliveries increased, women who delivered
in the beginning got the incentive and others were left
out. About 40 to 50 women did not get the incentive.
Those who did not get [the money] started fighting
with us." (District stakeholders, Hill, Focus group dis-
cussion)
In one place, the programme was put on hold because
there were inadequate funds, and staff were worried about
the consequences of only giving cash to some women:
"If we distribute the outstanding incentive of last year
from February onwards we need about five hundred
thousand rupees but we have received only one hun-
dred thousand. If we distribute this amount we are
sure to be beaten by women." (District stakeholders,
Mountain, Focus group discussion)
A number of ways to deal with the unpredictability of
funds were described. These included: making payment
on a first come first served basis; providing money out of
one's own pocket; giving a smaller amount of money to
share the cash across a larger number of women; and bor-
rowing from other sources. Some district health offices
used funds from other health programmes, whilst some
health institutions borrowed from their own account.
Some district officials, who were reluctant to borrow, wor-
ried that donor funds may not materialise, or felt it was
risky to borrow without approval.
"If we spend money from the regular budget head
funded by foreign donors we are questioned. If we
spend even after receiving an authorisation letter we
are questioned: 'why did we spend without receiving
the letter of release?' Even those taking risks are
trapped sometimes." (District health office, Plains,
Key informant interview)
"I am reluctant to use money from the hospital com-
mittee fund because donor funds are highly unpredict-
able and we do not know when they will come."
(District health office, Mountain, Key informant inter-
view)
Confusion about the policy
Many respondents were unclear about aspects of the pol-
icy. They reported that there had been inadequate dissem-
ination of information to the districts. The confusion
created variations in implementation and affected the
ability of health workers to disseminate information in
communities, potentially hampering the effectiveness of
the programme.
District officials and health workers were often confused
about how to implement the programme, finding the offi-
cial guidelines issued by central government unhelpful,
confusing and lacking in detail. There were reports of late
distribution of guidelines and insufficient copies, which
restricted their ability to implement the policy:
"The centre was so miserly to send only one guideline.
How do they think that this is sufficient to run [the
programme] in such a big district?" (District stake-
holders, Plains, Focus group discussion)
"Most importantly, the staff should be properly ori-
ented before launching the programme." (Health
post, Mountain, Key informant interview)
There was particular confusion about the eligibility of
health workers to receive the incentive, and the process of
reimbursement to health institutions for free delivery
care. Respondents did not know the cadres of health
worker and the place of delivery that ensured eligibility to
receive the money. Data suggest that the conditional cashPage 6 of 11
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were still some issues of confusion that led to deviations
from the stated policy. Sometimes cash was distributed to
women at ineligible health facilities and women were not
paid when they were referred:
"I am not sure about getting the incentive when refer-
ring the women to another facility after I attended her
first. And I am also not sure from which facility the
women will get the incentive..." (Primary health cen-
tre, Plains, Key informant interviews)
"We were all confused about how to distribute the
incentive and we were not sure whom to give, [and]
how much to give" (District stakeholders, Mountain,
Focus group discussion)
Districts disseminated information to the community
using various means, such as FM radio or through female
community health volunteers. However, district stake-
holders felt communication was hampered by a lack of
guidance on how to promote the policy, and the absence
of any budget allocation. Moreover, some respondents
felt it difficult to disseminate information about a pro-
gramme that they themselves did not fully understand.
Disseminating information about the programme was
particularly challenging in sparsely populated areas where
households were scattered. Respondents felt that poorer
women who tended to live in more remote areas were dis-
advantaged because they were less likely to know about
the programme. Women in more remote areas who had
not received the cash at delivery were also disadvantaged
as they were less likely to find out that the budget had
been released:
"Only advantaged women received the incentive as
they are better informed and are able to visit the health
facilities. The poor ones were not informed properly
and did not receive the incentive." (District stakehold-
ers, Plains, Focus group discussion)
"I am sure people in town know about the scheme but
I am not sure about in the villages" (District stakehold-
ers, Plains, Focus group discussion)
Misuse and monitoring
Respondents in several districts were concerned about
misuse of SDIP funds. Different types of misuse were
described, including: false claims by health workers for
deliveries that never took place; claims by health workers
for assisting deliveries in private clinics; claims for money
by women with more than two children; and skimming of
money by staff at the district level. Occasionally reports of
false claims were followed up, but the lack of a budget
provision hindered verification of parity or if a birth actu-
ally took place.
" [Health workers] are claiming incentives for deliver-
ies that they have attended in the local market place,
and registering them as institutional deliveries. And
there is no mechanism to check." (District stakehold-
ers, Plains, Focus group discussion)
"You know, sometimes the district level people keep
up to fifty percent of the incentive. I heard they make
false claims too." (Health post, Hill, Key informant
interview)
In some cases, it was not clear whether the lack of clarity
in the guidelines caused the (unintentional) misuse of
funds, or if they were wilfully misused. Either way,
respondents felt that there were opportunities for misap-
propriation of funds by virtue of the programme's design:
"When cash comes, there are possibilities for misuse,
this is the only problem." (District health office, Hill,
Key informant interview)
In almost all districts, respondents were unclear about
what was expected of them in terms of monitoring the
programme. There was a lack of guidance on how to mon-
itor and there was no separate budget or time allocation
to carry out these activities. Many felt that monitoring the
distribution of financial incentives was important, but
guidance had been insufficient.
"So far we have not monitored the programme and no
one has raised any question about this. However, this
now stands as a big issue." (District hospital, Hill, Key
informant interview)
"A separate budget for supervision and monitoring of
this scheme should be made available. The integrated
budget for monitoring is just not enough." (District
stakeholders, Hill, Focus group discussion)
No monitoring system had been established in any of the
districts we sampled. Some respondents felt that they had
not been given time to prepare recording and reporting
tools, and hasty implementation had resulted in an ina-
bility to plan or set up a monitoring system. Reporting
appeared to be on an ad hoc basis, provided 'on demand'
to representatives of non-governmental organisations and
central level officials, or in meetings where the pro-
gramme was discussed. In some places respondents felt
that health workers were not expected to monitor the
scheme, and this was the responsibility of those at the cen-
tral level or non-government organisations.Page 7 of 11
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Most respondents welcomed the idea of giving cash to
women delivering in a health facility and felt it was both
legitimate and helpful. However, they had specific con-
cerns with the eligibility criteria, questioning the logic of
only giving the cash to women with two or fewer children.
Respondents felt that this indirect discrimination, partic-
ularly against poorer women, opposed the overall aim of
the programme – to increase institutional deliveries and
reduce mortality:
"The poorest of the poor are excluded from the incen-
tive because the poor are the ones who have more than
two children. So there should not be any parity condi-
tion" (District health office, Hill, Key informant inter-
view)
"Women having more babies are subject to higher
risks and they are deprived of the incentive." (District
stakeholders, Plains, Focus group discussion)
"If safe motherhood is women's right, then what
about the rights of women having more than two chil-
dren?" (District stakeholders, Plains, Focus group dis-
cussion)
Health workers sometimes found themselves in difficult
situations, either being unable to provide the cash to
poorer women with greater need because they had more
than two children, or purposively ignoring the parity
restriction:
"Women with 4 or 5 babies must also have been paid
the incentive, because I have paid the incentive to
women with 3 babies" (District stakeholders, Plains,
Focus group discussion)
"It is difficult if rich people get money and poor peo-
ple do not get money...for example, a rich woman
came to the health institution for delivery and got the
incentive. A poor woman found out about the incen-
tive from that person but we could not give her the
incentive because she had more than two
babies...(this) makes me feel uneasy." (Primary health
centre, Hill, Key informant interview)
Other respondents were concerned about the practicali-
ties of reliably verifying the parity (and therefore eligibil-
ity) of women and methods of verification were
ineffective and sometimes restrictive:
"How can a woman go to the Village Development
Committee and get a certificate (of parity) before
going to the health institution for delivery? Currently
there is no local political representative, how can it be
practical?" (District hospital, Hill, Key informant
interview)
"The main barrier is to find out the number of babies,
even a mother with 3 or 4 babies claims that they have
just 2 babies, and we are not trained to find out the
parity (of the woman)." (District hospital, Hill, Key
informant interview)
There was widespread discontent with the health provider
incentive, even amongst those who benefit directly such
midwives. It strained relations between health staff, par-
ticularly when some felt the distribution of money was
unjust or higher qualified staff were ineligible to receive
the incentive:
"Distribution of incentives to health workers creates
tensions especially in cases of home delivery. Often
the home delivery is attended by one health worker
but others who do not attend also the want the money
to be equally distributed" (District stakeholders,
Plains, Focus group discussion)
"The guidelines are discriminatory by giving money to
maternal and child health workers and not auxiliary
health workers who are in charge. This issue is highly
controversial in my district." (Health post, Plains, Key
informant interview)
In one large hospital, managers wanted to avoid any con-
flict between staff and therefore no incentive was pro-
vided to health workers. Instead, the money was used to
make up the deficit in payments to women.
Respondents felt that effective implementation of the pro-
gramme required improvements in the availability and
quality of services. This typically manifested itself in a call
for greater investment in drugs, equipment and training of
skilled birth attendants:
"It does not help just to distribute money to women.
The skills of all health workers should be improved by
providing proper training." (District stakeholders,
Plains, Focus group discussion)
Many respondents suggested that funds should be used to
provide free delivery care, instead of allocation to the
SIDP, and some felt that the programme should be needs
based, targeting poorer women:
"It is not necessary to provide incentives to all women.
It should only be provided to poor women, otherwise
it is not worthwhile and it is a loss of money. On the
contrary, rich women should be charged...becausePage 8 of 11
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informant interivew)
"It would be even better if the amount of incentive
could be given to the hospital to make the delivery
service completely free." (District hospital, Hill, Key
informant interview)
Discussion
The paper has described the experiences of district level
actors in implementing the SDIP and illustrates a number
of challenges they faced. In the discussion, we expand on
the most important issues raised by respondents with ref-
erence to the wider literature on the implementation of
health policy in developing countries.
The study had a number of limitations. First, while it was
always our intention to follow a descriptive approach to
studying implementation [16], methods grounded in
health policy analysis theory may have been able to pro-
vide deeper insights by stating a set of hypotheses to test
empirically [24]. There are analytical frameworks, for
example, that integrate "politics, process and power into
the study of health policies" [15]. Second, we focused on
early implementation only, motivated by the need to pro-
vide timely findings in the evaluation of an ongoing pro-
gramme. We recognise this provides an incomplete
picture, a snapshot of implementation over what is, at a
minimum, a five-year programme. Third, all data collec-
tion was completed before the analysis of data was under-
taken. A more iterative process of data collection and
analysis would have improved the topic guides and expe-
rience of the interviewers.
Despite these limitations, the study was able to provide a
detailed account of the SDIP's early implementation. We
should not perhaps be surprised that early implementa-
tion faced several difficulties. It was a national pro-
gramme which was introduced rapidly without time set
aside for piloting or detailed planning at district level. The
large variation in practices suggests district managers and
health workers were able to exercise considerable discre-
tion in the implementation of the programme and it is
largely their actions that have determined how the policy
took shape on the ground. At the same time, a number of
factors at the central level imposed considerable con-
straints on the ability of actors in each of the districts to
implement the SDIP. Bureaucratic delays in the disburse-
ment of funds, difficulties in communicating the policy,
both to implementers and the wider public and the design
of the programme were cited by respondents as impor-
tant. It is these factors that provide the most convincing
explanation of why uptake of the programme was low.
Poor financial management, in particular, has been a
common theme emerging from the recent literature on
implementation of maternal health financing policies in
low-income countries [9,25,26].
Political expediency to ensure the policy was adopted
quickly [18] may have meant there was inadequate prep-
aration in the planning of resources and development of
certain mechanisms. Respondents frequently spoke about
the inadequacy of funds and acknowledged that the
means to verify the eligibility of women and monitor the
programme were lacking. Moreover, efforts by the central
level to retain substantial control of the implementation
process – by using an earmarked budget, providing pre-
scriptive (yet unclear) guidance on the policy, and offer-
ing few opportunities for feedback – may have
exacerbated problems and contributed further to the pro-
gramme's low uptake.
In this context, the actions of district level actors may be
seen as coping strategies to overcome (or avoid) the prob-
lems imposed on them from above and, in turn, they may
explain the reasons for the variation in uptake of the pro-
gramme between districts. Those who attempted to deal
with challenges were often driven by pressure to meet
local needs. Inaction, however, was equally common and
it is important to understand the motivations that influ-
enced the two sets of actors.
The most important coping strategy, given the bureau-
cratic delays at the central level, may have been the deci-
sion by some district managers to direct funds from other
budget lines for the purposes of the SDIP. This practice
presumably allowed implementation earlier than would
otherwise have been possible, but its impact on the
financing of other district health programmes is, from the
data, unclear. Prior perceptions about the unpredictability
of donor funding influenced the decision of some manag-
ers to refrain from using other budget lines and delay
implementation. It is also possible that this strict adher-
ence to government regulations may have represented a
reaction – particularly among those who had taken the
time to develop careful plans for how to allocate the SDIP
budget between health facilities – against the continued
pressure from the central government to use funds from
other budget headings.
The fear of having to deal with angry families demanding
their money appeared to be a motivating factor behind a
number of practices to manage the problem of unpredict-
able funding to health facilities. Health workers tried to
appease mothers by providing money out of their own
pocket, deducting an amount equivalent to the condi-
tional cash transfer from the hospital bill or sharing what
money they had among all those waiting. Another moti-
vating factor may have been the wide support for paying
mothers – also found elsewhere [1,9] – which resonatedPage 9 of 11
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than men. Some simply sidestepped the problem alto-
gether, putting the programme on hold so that no women
could claim the cash.
With respect to raising awareness, some districts under-
took local initiatives to communicate information about
the programme using, for example, FM radio. It suggests
that other districts could have done more to promote the
programme, but with widespread confusion among
implementers they themselves may have lacked the confi-
dence to take the initiative themselves.
It appears that the complexity of the programme – with
the different eligibility criteria for different incentives –
was itself a major barrier to implementation, exacerbated
further by the confusing guidelines. There is no denying
that such programmes are inherently complex; one only
needs to looks at Brazil's conditional cash transfer pro-
gramme, Bolsa Familia [27]. However, an alternative
approach to implementation may have promoted more
innovation and creativity at the district level with the
emphasis on reaching policy objectives, rather than spec-
ifying the policy in such detail, which probably made peo-
ple uncertain whether or not they could adapt the rules
when faced with problems.
Central to this question of why some district implement-
ers took actions to deal with problems and others did not
may be the widespread knowledge that the SDIP was
donor-funded. Interestingly, one of the reasons donors
provide funds directly to the recipient government's treas-
ury is to promote national ownership of policy. In prac-
tice, however, there appeared to be little ownership of the
policy at the district level. The SDIP was perceived by
many as a 'programme', whose activities were regarded as
additional to the routine of government. Respondents
maintained that monitoring, supervision and communi-
cation of the programme could not be carried out using
available resources and the fact that there was no budget
provision or explicit time allocation for these tasks rein-
forced the idea that they should be done by external mon-
itors from the central level or NGOs. Other studies have
found that such perceptions can be lead to inaction and a
general reluctance to carry out tasks demanded of the cen-
tral level [28-30].
Several issues arose that may have had serious implica-
tions for the wider public health system, highlighting the
potential of the SDIP to have (unforeseen) adverse effects.
The perception that health providers may have held
money rather than paying women can only have eroded
further the community's trust in the public health system,
thereby reducing demand for all health services, not just
delivery care. Equally serious, but from the perspective of
service provision, was the tension between staff caused by
the provider incentive. Any conflict between staff is likely
to have consequences for all health services provided by
the health facility. In this regard, the central level could
have devoted more time to explaining the rationale for the
provider incentive (ie. why only some cadres were eligible
for the incentive) in order to build legitimacy of this ele-
ment of the SDIP.
Conclusion
Changes made to the SDIP since the study suggest devel-
opment and implementation of the policy has been a
dynamic process. In late 2007, the Government of Nepal
made a number of changes, reflecting some of the most
important concerns of respondents in this study. The eli-
gibility criteria to receive the conditional cash transfer to
women were removed, allowing all women to benefit and
simplifying the programme enormously. The programme
was expanded to include not-for-profit hospitals in order
to address concerns about the availability of obstetric serv-
ices. A national information campaign and district level
training of staff were carried out to improve awareness
and understanding of the programme. The orientation, in
particular, provided a forum for district level staff to voice
concerns and have greater exposure to information about
the programme. Finally, procedures to manage and dis-
burse funds at the central level were streamlined to reduce
delays. These changes are welcome and they were most
likely responsible for substantial increases in the uptake of
the programme in its third year [19]. More recently, the
government announced further changes, abolishing user
fees for delivery care at all public health facilities while
continuing to provide the SDIP's conditional cash transfer
to women. Given the problems with early implementa-
tion and the adjustments made by policymakers, it will be
important to evaluate the impact and implementation of
the SDIP over the first five years.
The success of conditional cash transfer programmes in
Latin America has led to a wave of enthusiasm for their
adoption in other parts of the world. However, context
matters and proponents of similar programmes in south
Asia should give due attention to the challenges to imple-
mentation when capacity is weak and health services inad-
equate. There is a need for both careful planning in their
roll out and closer engagement with district level actors,
who exercise considerable influence in the implementa-
tion of policy.
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